Introduction
The paper focuses on the importance in having adequate assumptions about the nature of social behavior in designing training materials oriented toward the goal of disaster reduction. The paper will argue that disaster is a social rather than a %aturalV1 happening. Thus any effort at disaster reduction will involve planning and action by various social units. The success of those efforts will depend on the adequacy of understanding that social base. The local cornunity is taken as the primary focus of attention since that is the common unit which is affected by disaster and, more importantly, responds to deal with the event.
Disaster planning is seen as an ongoing social activity which needs to be incorporated into social life, and disaster training needs to be incorporated at different social locations within a society. That training should not be organized on a prescriptive or a normative basis but should be grounded in the existing knowledge of disaster behavior. Although that knowledge base has been derived from research in industrialized societies, much of it can be applied more universally.
Three different illustrations from the literature will be detailed --first, on the form of preparedness planning for response; second, on dealing with flood mitigation issues and third, on resettlement, an often suggested solution for recovery and for future mitigation. Finally, certain criteria will be suggested for evaluating the utility of various disaster reduction efforts.
Disaster as a Ilsocial'l rather than a *rnaturalvl hameninq. For example, for one family to lose its house -a disaster to the family -does not necessarily mean either physical or social damage to the community.
Part of the difficulty we have in communication relates
Even considerable physical damage does not automatically translate into social damage.
The tenuous relationship between physical damage and "socialt8 damage can be illustrated by the fact that the 1988 earthquake in Armenia was 6.9 on the Richter Scale.
That earthquake killed approximately 25,000, injured more than 31,000 and left 514,000 homeless. The next year, an earthquake of greater magnitude (7.1) occurred in the United States; the Loma Prieta earthquake killed 62, injured 3,757 and left more than 12,000 homeless. High density populations in flood plains and unreinforced housing are far more important than the physical agent in creating the human and property losses and the disruptions of community routines. The physical agents act as only triggering events and in fact many social consequences can still occur without the physical effects, such as reactions to glfalsell alarms.
The fact that %atural1! disasters are social rather than natural phenomena has a number of implications.
1. Prevention and mitigation must stress social, rather than physical, solutions.
2.
Disaster planning is not primarily the search for the implementation of technological solutions. 3. The emphasis on the social allows for the opportunity for proactive, rather than reactive strategies.
Thus, it is possible to take actions prior to the appearance of the physical agent. 4. The emphasis in planning can be on internal, rather than on external factors. The potential threat is not I1out there," but resided in the llinternaltl flaws within the social system.
5.
The view of disasters as social phenomena allows such happenings to be incorporated as a part of the nation's development process. In fact, what is often called the llrecoveryll process after a disaster is development in and of itself. That is, the recovery process is a process in which the population improves its level of adaptation to its environment and also lowers its future vulnerabilities.
The social nature of the concept of disaster is reflected in the conventional definition that "disasters are events in which societies or their larger subunits incur physical damages and losses and/or disruption of their routine functioning. Both the causes and effects of these events are related to the social structure and processes of societies and their subunits.11 (Kreps, 1989 , building on Fritz, 1961) An even more clearly sociological definition has been suggested by Dynes that disaster is a normatively defined occasion in a community when extraordinary efforts are taken to protect and benefit some social resource whose existence is perceived as threatened." (1989) If lldisastersll are social occurrences, then any effort to enhance disaster reduction involves planning and action by various social units. The direction of that planning effort will depend on the nature of the social unit, not on the nature of the physical agent. One discussion of research results (Drabek, 1986) orders those findings in terms of social units with increasing structural complexity --from individual, group, organizational community, society and international.
Such a classification suggests that planning efforts would have a different focus depending on the social unit. On the other hand, it will be argued here that the focus of planning which would have the greatest potential impact would be the local community. Local communities are those social units where there is the greatest potential for impact. In addition, the local community as a collectivity has greater resources to respond to the social disruption than do individuals, groups and organizations.
In particular, local communities are likely to become involved in responding to disasters prior to the involvement of social units in the larger society or from the international system. In other words, the success or failure of planning effort is more likely to be revealed at the local community level. In addition, the local community is a generic form of social organization in every society, since it has a territorial base and is organized to llsolve** certain problems for that population. Disaster planning should be generic, rather than agent specific, especially with respect tothe more human, social aspects of disasters. (Quarantelli, 1991) Whatever the specific agent, the same general activities have to be undertaken, whether the tasks be warning, evacuation, sheltering, feeding, search and rescue, handling of the dead and injured, the mobilization of resources, communications among organizations, public information, etc. The importance of a generic approach may be less so for engineering and technical solutions to specific techniques of mitigation. Mitigation, however, is the social attempt to reduce the occurrence of a disaster, to reduce the vulnerability of certain populations and to more equitably distribute the costs within the society.
Planning must focus on general principles rather than on specific details. The concentration on details is one reason for the size and lack of use of most disaster planning. Of course, good disaster planning should be both vertically and horizontally integrated. That is, vertical planning at different governmental and also non-governmental levels need to be linked with planning at other levels.
National planning needs to reinforce local and regional planning efforts.
(It is likely that most national planning currently does little to reinforce local community level planning.) In addition, the planning in the different time phases need to be linked. For example, if evacuees are sheltered in a flood plain, this will be a disincentive for the implementation of a plan to restrict future occupancy.
Perhaps most important here is that planning will be no better than the assumptions and understandings about human behavior in disaster. In effect, disaster planning should not be oriented to the specific agent but directed toward "peoplet1 in dealing with new sets of problems. Now, there are a series of common assumptions about behavior which continually impede adequate planning efforts. For example, since it is widely assumed that people will panic with a knowledge of threat; warnings are withheld so that realistic protective actions cannot be taken. It is assumed that disasters make people helpless so planning assumes that governmental agencies must care for dependent people. This is a common assumption by national bureaucrats in both governmental and non-governmental agencies. Furthermore, disaster planning is often an attempt on the part of various organizations to make the disaster most convenient for the activities of their own organization. Many disaster plans spend an inordinate amount of effort to deal with questions of llauthority,ll usually in the attempt to enhance their own authority in the emergency. Much current disaster planning also assumes that the addition of new technology is the key to future effectiveness, newer problems to be solved by adequate disaster planning.
Dependence on technology is simply one of
To increase efficiency and effectiveness, disaster planning needs to be built into the culture and social structure to insure that habits and social mechanisms allow a community to mobilize the human and materials resources. That mobilization is intended to reduce the current risks within the environment, to respond to emergency situations and to restore and enhance those adaptations for the future, Much of current disaster planning, however, attempts to llfitll people into plans and view llpeoplell as the major problem, rather than major resources. It is common for those who propose technological solutions for mitigation to blame the llpeoplell for the lack of acceptance of such llinnovations.ll Too, the expectation that only governments need to plan, but people need to be cared for, reinforces the stereotype of dependency and is self-fulfilling. By contrast, we know that almost all search and rescue in disaster is done by victims and their neighbors, so rather than enhancing the equipment of national search and rescue professionals who will arrive after the process is complete, planning should enhance that local, non-professional but effective response.
(For example, information could be disseminated as to how search and rescue might best be approached to minimize additional medical problems and by providing a supply of llcommunityll shovels, rather than by purchasing technology to be located at some distant provincial headquarters.)
Most disaster plans assume that llvictimsll are dependent, forgetting that may have their own plans and also may also make intelligent adaptations.
When people take individual and independent actions, government officials often claim that the plan would be effective if it had just been followed. But if a plan is not llfollowed,ll that is the fault of the plan, not the llpeople.ll Rather than forcing people to fit some artificial plan, it is always more effective to fit plans to people, using as the planning base the patterns of existing behavior which can be adapted to the Itnew1g situation. The point is mentioned here in part to question an implicit assumption that, in almost all respects, developing countries as a whole are worse off in disaster planning than developed societies, especially given that few or no organizations are specifically oriented to.disaster problems, be they mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery.
On the Knowledae Base and Its Application to Developins
But if disaster subcultures exist, this would not be the case. In addition, if in existence, they clearly provide a well rooted social base on which new disaster planning could be grafted.
Even given the fact that most of the social science research has been derived from western industrialized society does not necessarily present a problem. If theories are properly stated, 
The Importance of Adecruate Assumptions
Unfortunately, much of the planning activity around the world and the materials which are generated to support it elaborate with considerable detail the characteristics of certain disaster agents followed by prescriptive details about what everyone should do and who should be able to tell others what to do, Reading such prescriptions conveys the impression that llpeoplell are the major problem and that social life as it was constituted prior to the disaster, will become threatened unless strong authority is emphasized.
Three areas are given closer examination here. The first area is the assumptions on which much current emergency planning is based.
The second area centers on the assumptions which guide mitigation activities in certain flood situations. The third area is resettlement, which is often suggested duringthe recovery phase and justified on the basis of its contribution to mitigation. In each of these areas, there has been enough confirming research to develop policy direction which more closely fit expected social behavior. 
A. Emersencv Preparedness

C. Resettlement of Populations --Recovery and Mitisation
History is filled with examples of populations being relocated, usually with the combined rationale of @*helping them recover from a past disasterg1 and ''helping them avoid a future disaster.
Most of those examples are illustrations of failures but, on occasion, those failures might also be counted as successes.
After falling once to an attack by Indians, weathering a series of 8 serious earthquakes and suffering a huge landslide, all between the 16th and 18th centuries, the Spanish Captain General of Santiago de Guatemala gave the order in 1773 for the site to be abandoned and the city to be relocated for the third time to safer terrain. The citizenry objected to the decision, but the relocation began nonetheless in 1775 and a new capital, Nueva Guatemala de la Asuncion, was founded.
Many people, however, still refused to abandon the old site, now known as Antigua, and refused to move, whereupon the authorities forcibly closed the city's remaining stores in 1779. All these efforts notwithstanding, the old site was almost immediately repopulated and continues to exist today as one of Guatemala's major tourist attractions. This would include understanding the economic dimensions of the community, including present access to transportation, etc as well as attention given to the symbolic aspects of the present community.
The best judgement of the importance of such issues can be determined by asking the residents (and utilizing the traditional decision making modes).
8. In general, the inhabitants of communities will make a more successful transition if they feel that the effort will benefit them in some way, rather than seeing relocation as a punishment. This is particularly true of lower class communities. Therefore, the more incentives that can be built into the plan, the better. Collective gains will be more important than individual gains. Thus, considerable thought should be given to ways that the collective and symbolic life of the community can be enhanced.
9. Any relocation plan needs to take into account the symbiotic relationship of the present community to other communities. It is likely that nearby communities are closely tied economically and by kinship. That context needs to be continued in the new location.
10.
The whole process can be enhanced if the responsibility is located in one government agency which in turn will act as a broker to other government agencies. It will be sufficiently traumatic for people to go through the relocation process dealing with one agency, not multiple bureaucracies.
11. It would seem that the most successful relocations have been those which emerged from the consideration of those who would be located that such a decision is merited and that the advantages to the community would be greater than the losses which would be incurred by leaving their traditional location.
Criteria for Evaluation
The emphasis here has been on developing adequate assumptions about the nature of disaster planning in a variety of different social systems.
Sometimes, the concentration on cross-societal differences will preclude the understanding that there are many communalities which will always be present. In that context, it might be possible to identify certain general principles of evaluation. The following can be suggested: Specific criteria for mitigation:
To be accepted mitigation measures: need to be close as possible to everyday practices, have to be politically realistic, and should be economically viable.
Specific criteria for preparedness:
There is good preparedness for disasters when there is: anticipation of possible problems, different solutions or options for dealing with them, and allowance for possible emergent behaviors. specific criteria for response:
Management of a disaster response is good if there is: efficient mobilization of personnel and resources, adequate processing of information, and an adequate development of coordination.
Specific criteria for recovery:
Recovery measures will be most accepted if they: preplanned into the development planning of a society, not too grandiose or ambitious, and involve as many sectors of the community possible in the decision making. 
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